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Abstract
Some critics of invasion biology have argued the invasion of ecosystems by
nonindigenous species can create more valuable ecosystems. They consider
invaded communities as more valuable because they potentially produce more
ecosystem services. To establish that the introduction of nonindigenous species
creates more valuable ecosystems, they defend that value is provisioned by eco-
system services. These services are derived from ecosystem productivity, the
production and cycling of resources. Ecosystem productivity is a result of bio-
diversity, which is understood as local species richness. Invasive species
increase local species richness and, therefore, increase the conservation value
of local ecosystems. These views are disseminating to the public via a series of
popular science books. Conservationists must respond to these views, and I
outline a method of rejecting such arguments against controlling invasive spe-
cies. Ecological systems are valuable for more than local productivity and bio-
diversity is not accurately described by a local species count.
KEYWORD S
beta-diversity, biodiversity, ecosystem services, invasive species, invasive species
scepticism, option value
1 | INTRODUCTION
It is common practice throughout the world to control inva-
sive species populations to maintain the character and com-
position of ecological communities. Invasive populations
are controlled through the reduction or elimination of their
populations and preventing their movement into new areas
(Kopf et al., 2017). Scepticism toward the control of invasive
species populations has flourished recently with a series of
scientists, environmental journalists, and other academics
arguing there is rarely reason to control invasive species
(Marris, 2011; Pearce, 2015; Sagoff, 2005; Thomas, 2017;
Thompson, 2014). This movement has been described as
invasive species denialism, and while there are moments
when this literature tips into denialism, there are legitimate
arguments that warrant serious consideration (Frank, 2019;
Russell & Blackburn, 2017). In this paper, I draw out and
critique an argument that has coalesced within the Invasive
Species Sceptics (who I will refer to as sceptics) literature.
This argument is separate from the standard animal
welfare-based arguments that motivate the “compassionate
conservation” movement (Wallach, Bekoff, Batavia, Nelson,
& Ramp, 2018) or arguments that concepts such as “native-
ness” or “invasive species” are not well-defined or useful
(Chew & Hamilton, 2011). Instead, the argument addressed
here proposes that invasive species are, all things consid-
ered, not bad for humanity. I aim to clearly represent the
argument, so that scientists may directly address it, and
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illustrate some possible responses. In my view, the argu-
ment pivots on what I consider an illegitimate use of the
concept “biodiversity.” The sceptics equivocate between
their interpretation of “biodiversity,” and indeed “ecosystem
services” as well, and the interpretations of these concepts
which are more common to conservation science to make it
appear that their position is not as radical as it is. Their
argument against the control of invasive species can be
found scattered through multiple sources and can be
reconstructed as follows:
1.1 | Why we should not control invasive
nonindigenous species
1. We should not control populations if they promote
ecosystem services (more than any readily available
alternative).
2. Invasion often increases biodiversity.
3. More biodiversity results in more ecosystem services.
4. Invasive species often promote ecosystem services (2, 3).
Conclusion: We should not control invasive species as
they often promote ecosystem services (1, 4).
This is an extrapolation of a more moderate position,
which states that invasive species can contribute to ecosys-
tem services and we should not control a population when
these contributions are on sum worth more than the cost of
population control (Davis et al., 2011). The above argument
generalizes the particular, stating on sum we are not
warranted acting on invasive species. This implies that
research is required to justify preventing the movement of a
population into wilderness areas or eradicating a population
while it has a small abundance and before it substantially
impacts an area. Both positions somewhat utilize the diffi-
culty in conducting cost–benefit analyses of species impacts
to support inaction (Courtois, Figuieres, Mulier, &
Weill, 2018). While some may claim this strong view is a
fringe argument of a small vocal minority, this is only true
internally to the field of conservation science itself. Several
of the books that defend this view received wide media
attention, particularly The New Wild (Pearce, 2015). These
views are disseminating through the public and it is critical
to stakeholder engagement for conservationists to respond
to these arguments.
The idea that invasive species increase biodiversity,
and in turn ecosystem services, is unsurprising given the
dominant paradigms in conservation ecology, found
within the Biodiversity-Ecosystem Services (BES) litera-
ture. It has only really been reapplied, with some modifi-
cations, to new conclusions by the sceptics (Pearce, 2015;
Sagoff, 2005, 2018; Thomas, 2013, 2017) or accepted as an
implication of the BES framework (Odenbaugh, 2020).
This argument can also be converted into a reductio
against the BES conservation framework (Newman,
Varner, & Linquist, 2017). In section 2, I flesh out the
argument and situate it in the literature. I critique the
argument for deploying impoverished operationalizations
of key conservation concepts, biodiversity, and ecosystem
services. In section 3, I discuss how ecosystem productiv-
ity fails to encompass the range of services proposed
within the ecosystem services conservation framework.
In section 4, I turn to how local species richness misses
many of the critical values the “biodiversity” concept was
designed to encompass. Finally, I conclude by conceding
some roles nonindigenous species play in contributing to
biodiversity (section 5).
2 | UNPACKING THE ARGUMENT
2.1 | Environment as a service provider
The initial premise, “(w)e should not control populations
if they promote ecosystem services,” is a corollary of the
position that we should preserve species because they
provide ecosystem services. Following the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MA), which found that ecosys-
tem degradation was a major threat to current and future
human wellbeing, ecosystem services have become a
major focus of conservation (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, 2005). Ecosystem services are, “the condi-
tions and processes through which natural ecosystems,
and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill
human life” (Daily, 1997, p. 3). More generally, they are
considered goods of immediate economic utility. Varying
interpretations of “ecosystem services” has led to a litera-
ture in which the empirical work, ethical work, and con-
ceptual work do not always lead to the same conclusions
about what is worthy of conservation.
There is serious debate about what of nature's value is
captured by ecosystem services (Schröter et al., 2014).
Under some interpretations, anything related to our
immediate preferences for nature can be labeled ecosys-
tem services. Conservationists often raise values they
believe are not contained within the ecosystem services
framework, only to find those within the framework
replying that the value raised against them are included
(e.g., option value in Faith, 2010; Perrings et al., 2010).
Sometimes it appears that ecosystem services proponents
state a type of value can conceptually be part of the ser-
vices framework without indicating how the biological
features their experiments quantify represent this source
of value. A crucial example of this is that many experi-
ments examining the relationship between biodiversity
and ecosystem services use biomass production, or net
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primary production, as a proxy for ecosystem services
generally (Newman et al., 2017).
Biomass produced is not representative of the range
of values people have toward the environment, but it is
readily measurable and represents ecosystem productiv-
ity. There is a neat conceptual connection between biodi-
versity, functional diversity, and ecosystem productivity.
The thought being biodiverse assemblages will be func-
tionally diverse, providing many ways to process
resources, with diverse processing and specialization the
ecosystem will be highly productive. This is appealing as
each component is readily quantifiable. Strong propo-
nents of the premise that ecosystem services are the sole
justification for conservation can be found within the
BES literature as much as within the invasive species
sceptic literature, some of whom recognize other types of
environmental values (see Marris, 2011). For example,
Dasgupta, Kinzig, and Perrings (2013) represent biodiver-
sity as only being valuable insofar as it provides ecologi-
cal functions that can then make productive ecosystems.
The representation of biodiversity as only being justi-
fied through its relationship to the production or cycling
of resources diminishes the variety of values associated
with biodiversity. Sometimes biodiversity is represented
as either being valuable as it is a cause of services or
it has intrinsic value, which is notoriously difficult to
quantify and whose existence is contested (e.g., Reyers,
Polasky, Tallis, Mooney, & Larigauderie, 2012). This all
creates the perception, whether justified or not, that bio-
diversity only derives value from its provision of a narrow
set of services, usually equated with resource production
and cycling. This underemphasizes the cultural, regulat-
ing, and supporting services ecosystems provide. It is this
narrow interpretation of the relationship between biodi-
versity and ecosystem services, or more commonly the
accidental use of language which represents this relation-
ship as narrow, which warrants the conclusion we should
not control invasive species.
2.2 | Invasive species increase
biodiversity
Despite many invasive species causing local extinctions,
their addition to new ecosystems does not necessarily
lead to drastic species loss. There is strong evidence that
local species richness worldwide has recently either
remained stable or increased (Dornelas et al., 2014; Sax &
Gaines, 2003). Invasive species can increase the number
of species locally; as Pearce (2015 p. 9) says “Rather than
reducing biodiversity, the novel new worlds that result
(from invasives) are usually richer in species than what
went before.” Local species numbers generally appear to
be a product of the regional pool of species
(Ricklefs, 1987). With global connectivity increasing (the
“New Pangea” celebrated by Thomas, 2017), so has the
“regional” species pool. This has ultimately driven up
local species richness.
Assessing species richness is not a simple process.
Sometimes ecologists exclude nonindigenous species
from local species counts, but as Sagoff (2005, p. 229)
argues excluding these populations from such counts by
stipulation is just dodgy accounting. But contra Sagoff
and other critics of invasive species science and manage-
ment, any semantic argument utilizing species richness
without effort to address the complexities of scale will
misrepresent the natural patterns of species distributions.
Representing species diversity at multiple scales cannot
be done with any single equation (Whittaker, Willis, &
Field, 2001).
Local increase in species richness has been coupled
with global species loss (Dirzo & Raven, 2003). This phe-
nomenon has been described as “the biodiversity para-
dox” (Vellend, 2017). The explanation for the paradox is
evident, if you add many common nonindigenous species
to an area but lose fewer endemic or rare native species
there will be increasing local species counts and global
species loss. Australia (and the world) has lost the desert
bandicoot (Perameles eremiana) but gained the red fox,
cat, black rat, and common pigeon; a triumph!
Ultimately, this indicates simply discussing species
numbers misses much of the picture in ecological sys-
tems. There must be some attempt to address the rela-
tionships between populations. Co-evolved populations
have interdependencies, which invasive species can dis-
rupt causing cascading extinctions (Simberloff, 2013).
While such losses can be recouped through introducing
more species, the losses are significant for community
composition. The species lost are often specialists who
are co-adapted to other local species, the populations
introduced are often generalists who can utilize a range
of resources and live within varied conditions (Clavel,
Julliard, & Devictor, 2011). This leads to the global loss of
functional diversity as generalist species prosper. The
structure of species interactions must be incorporated
into any picture of conservation due to how these inter-
dependencies both lead to species loss and structure
biodiversity.
2.3 | Biodiversity yields ecosystem
services
The next step in the case against invasive species control
is that the increase in local species counts, due to the
introduction of nonindigenous species, results in more
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ecosystem services. The BES research program supports
the case for invasive species increasing the value of eco-
systems. There is a great deal of evidence, predominantly
from plants assemblages, that biodiversity increases eco-
system functioning, which increases ecosystem services
(Haines-Young & Potschin, 2010; Loreau et al., 2001;
Mace, Norris, & Fitter, 2012). If nonindigenous species
increase biodiversity, then they increase the ecosystems
services, which facilitate nature's value to humanity. Or
as Mark Sagoff states, “If in any scientific (e.g., random)
sample of ecosystems introduced organisms generally,
overwhelmingly, and typically increase species richness,
and if species richness supports desirable ecosystem prop-
erties, then one could argue these organisms benefit
those systems” (Sagoff, 2005, p. 225).
The BES research program has predominantly consid-
ered the effects of biodiversity as measured in species rich-
ness on ecosystems (Hendriks & Duarte, 2008). The most
studied effect variable of the biodiversity and ecosystem ser-
vices relationship is the extent to which ecosystems produce
biomass (Cardinale et al., 2011). The scales assessed in these
experiments are generally local, only occurring over scales
up to 100 m. Conservation policy likewise is conducted on
the scale of hectares (Srivastava & Vellend, 2005). Srivastava
and Vellend (2005) take this as evidence that we should be
sceptical of the significance of the biodiversity–ecosystem
services relationship in conservation, while the sceptics'
take this local-scale relationship as support of their view.
The scales considered by the science, and the policy, can be
understood as supporting the sceptics' conclusions that we
should not control populations of invasive species as on
local scales they generally increase species richness and,
therefore, ecosystem services.
3 | ECOSYSTEM SERVICES:
PROBLEMS WITH PRODUCTIVITY
Even granting the primacy of ecosystem services in conser-
vation policy, these services come with deceptive variations
in how tangible and quantifiable they are. The Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment identifies four types of service: provi-
sioning (e.g., wood), regulating (e.g., water quality), cultural
(e.g., recreation), and supporting (e.g., carbon cycle)
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Despite the
scope of the services described, the empirical research on
such services historically has narrowed its focus to predomi-
nantly the relationship between species richness and bio-
mass or net primary production (e.g., Cardinale et al., 2011;
Carpenter et al., 2006; Costanza, Fisher, Mulder, Liu, &
Christopher, 2007). Ecosystem productivity undoubtedly
influences the different forms of services provided, it is cru-
cial for both the provision of resources and the regulation of
resource cycles. But the emphasis on resource production
and cycling to the exclusion of other modes by which ser-
vices are provided, particularly cultural services, stack the
deck toward invasive species. One could counter that eco-
system services are more widely measured than biomass,
which is true (Costanza, 2015). The issue, however, is that
services have historically disproportionately used biomass
as a proxy (Newman et al., 2017), which allows for this style
of argument to be constructed. Echoes of this historical
trend can be seen in the modern literature, a recent meta-
analysis shows that while ecosystem production and ecosys-
tem provisioning of services was measured by 67 and
68% of studies, only 35% measured the cultural services eco-
systems provided (Boerema, Rebelo, Bodi, Esler, &
Meire, 2017).
Invasive species can contribute to services and
reduce services, often simultaneously doing both, and
empirical research is required to determine to what
degree (Boltovskoy, Sylvester, & Paolucci, 2018). But
the relative contribution of species to the productivity
of an ecosystem is highly influenced by the sheer abun-
dance of that population (Winfree, Fox, Williams,
Reilly, & Cariveau, 2015). This makes ecosystem pro-
ductivity quite antithetical to conservation's aims of
preserving endemic and rare species, which are often
not abundant. Many rare, threatened, and endangered
species are “functionally extinct” in that they are not
able to have strong effects on the ecosystem they reside
within. Within a BES framework, where productivity
and direct causal contribution is emphasized, such spe-
cies lack value. Instead, it is the hyper-abundant and
highly productive species that contribute. The features
that make invasive species invasive rather than just
nonindigenous is their ability to rapidly grow in abun-
dance and exclude other populations through their
consumption (Simberloff, 2013). Their ability to pro-
duce biomass, or “cycle” biomass to through predation
or herbivory to disproportionally increase their repre-
sentation, is what allows them to physically exclude
local species. These properties are given a new presen-
tation by sceptics, their rapid increases in abundance
and biomass make them productive ecosystem services
providers (Pearce, 2015). Invasive species then should
be considered as “super species” due to their success
moving across the globe and processing biomass
(Hamilton, 2010). It is the framing of biodiversity's
value as being strongly connected to the productivity of
whole ecosystems that leads to these conclusions.
Conservationists have warned against strongly con-
necting conservation to ecological productivity (Faith,
2018; Silvertown, 2015). Following his reflections on
Leopold's land ethic Michael Soulé warned us that justify-
ing conservation through ecosystem processes would
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facilitate the conclusion we should replace native species
with invasives:
It is technically possible to maintain ecolo-
gical processes, including a high level of
economically beneficial productivity, by
replacing the hundreds of native plants,
invertebrates and vertebrates with about
15 or 20 introduced, weedy species….
WARNING! Be suspicious of “ecologists”
who are pitching ecological services (for peo-
ple) and who speak of “redundant” species
or “hyperdiversity.” (Soulé, 1996, p. 60)
In the face of such warnings we now find, two
decades on, significant support for the idea invasive spe-
cies are “super species,” which can replace natives due to
their productivity (e.g., Pearce, 2015).
4 | BIODIVERSITY
4.1 | Biodiversity is more than species
richness
In the case of invasive species being added to the local
species pool, biodiversity is increased under the ass-
umption that biodiversity is local species richness
(Pearce, 2015; Thomas, 2017). Invasive species sceptics
expect this increase to outpace local species extinctions.
Local species count, or species richness, is widely known
as α (Alpha) diversity. When the local extinctions are of
species endemic to that region, global species counts
reduce. This global inventory of species is γ (Gamma)
diversity, or more accurately the inventory of all the local
systems being analyzed. These two diversity measures
take an inventory of the populations or species or similar
unit of biodiversity in their region. There is another
count, which is widely considered an essential target in
conservation. This is β (Beta) diversity, which is a com-
parative measure of diversity between regions. It con-
siders how many new species are added to the regional
species pool by an area. By taking biodiversity as only α
diversity, sceptics significantly underplay the damage
nonindigenous species do by diminishing γ diversity and
β diversity.
β diversity is a measure of the entities which comprise
biodiversity, biodiversity units; these are generally coun-
ted as species but can be other entities (Sarkar, 2016). For
example, the entities being counted could be the distinct
habitat types in an area, like shrublands or deciduous
tree forest, or biotic “features,” which are the biotic traits
possessed by populations such as their genes or their
“functions.” Further dimensions of biodiversity could be
argued for such as diversity of biotic interactions (Luna,
Corro, Antoniazzi, & Dattilo, 2020). These can be under-
stood as compromising different levels of biodiversity and
we may have reason to count all or some (Faith, 2016;
Lean & Sterelny, 2016). A local ecosystem will have
higher β diversity the more unique biodiversity units it
adds to the previously assessed regional pools, the “com-
plementary” units of diversity (see Figure 1). If there are
no previously assessed areas, then we are making a count
of biodiversity units in an area, which is equivalent to α
diversity.
Adding new species to those already protected
increase β diversity but species are not equivalent.
Many species are extremely similar (e.g., cryptic spe-
cies). Complementarity has been incorporated into
algorithms to identify species that are the least similar
to each other (Faith, 1992; Vane-Wright, Humphries, &
Williams, 1991). The disparity between species can be
represented through measuring their phylogenetic dis-
tance or the functional differentiation (see Magurran &
McGill, 2011). There are continuing debates on which
measures best represent biological difference but incor-
porating the extent to which populations themselves
contribute unique features is an extension of comple-
mentarity and biodiversity measurement (Lean, 2017;
Lean & Maclaurin, 2016).
β diversity is generally thought of as an essential compo-
nent of biodiversity preservation practice (Sarkar, 2012,
2016; Socolar, Gilroy, Kunin, & Edwards, 2016). This is par-
tially due to a conceptual claim, biodiversity as a concept is
designed to maximize the representation of difference or
variety in life forms. Regardless of the entities measured as
FIGURE 1 Plots, I, which contains 7 species, and II, which has
4 (α diversity). Plot II has two unique species which Plot I does not
(β diversity). Their combined species count is 9 (γ diversity). If two
of Plot I's species (F, C) invade Plot II, and one of II's unique
species (H) is eradicated then II increases its α diversity by 1 but its
β diversity is reduced by 1
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representing biodiversity, higher β diversity results in more
biotic variety, therefore, should be incorporated into conser-
vation decision-making (Sarkar, 2006). Complementarity
already has featured in the practice of conservation plan-
ning for 40 years to select areas that represent the most dis-
tinct lifeforms (Kirkpatrick, Brown, & Moscal, 1980). It is
both part of the practice of conservation and part of the the-
oretical framework of biodiversity conservation. Insofar as
biodiversity aims to represent more than just a tally it must
quantify unique entities.
4.2 | Valuing biodiversity beyond species
richness
The values represented through β and γ diversity are not
easily captured within the α diversity focused BES frame-
work. Local α diversity is required to understand the goods
local interacting populations produce, but β diversity repre-
sents more abstract values. β diverse ecosystems have value
over copies of common ecosystem types, their uniqueness
connects them to the overall range of forms found in life on
earth (γ diversity). Local ecosystem productivity is irrelevant
to the value created by these forms of diversity and vice
versa. Local tallies of biological entities cannot represent
the full range of biological values as they ignore how the
preservation of a range of unique variety is valuable.
Ecosystem services are not the only or original justifi-
cation for preserving biodiversity. Biodiversity was
designed to represent the range of biological features that
exist (Soulé, 1985; Wilson, 1992) including key values
overlooked in the search for productivity: heritage and
option value. These values are not derived from immedi-
ate use and may be difficult to represent economically
(Silvertown, 2015).
• Option value: Biodiversity is the most direct way to
preserve option value. The preservation of a range of
biological features is a prudent bet-hedging strategy to
account for future uncertainty (Faith, 1992;
Maclaurin & Sterelny, 2008; Lean, 2017; Owen,
Gumbs, Gray, & Faith, 2019; cf. Maier, 2012; Newman
et al., 2017). The utility of diverse features of life can-
not be accurately known. These values need not only
be in their use for commerce or medicine (future mon-
etization). Human preferences may change in their
representation of what they find aesthetically appeal-
ing or culturally significant. Given that the losses of
biological features are irreversible, we need to guard
against the risk involved in losing these goods
(Arrow & Fisher, 1974).
• Heritage value: Heritage value is commonly derived
from an entity having cultural significance to a group
of people, usually developed over extended periods
(Thompson, 2000). Just as old buildings or artworks
have both an intellectual value, in that they are a
record of history and culture, and are of aesthetic
value, often because they are a physical representation
of the past, so too does biodiversity (Russow, 1981;
Sober, 1986). This creates a relationship between local
people and the history of environmental systems.
Nonindigenous species can have heritage value too,
but indigenous species, due to their historical connec-
tion to their native range, tend to have high heritage
value. While cultural significance is mentioned in the
wider ecosystem service framework, a focus on produc-
tivity ignores these values.
These values are more difficult to quantify within the
ecosystem services framework but they are still
instrumental-anthropocentric values. A sophisticated eco-
system services framework could incorporate them, but
when such a framework is skewed toward ecosystem pro-
ductivity and local species counts, they are undervalued.
4.3 | Valuing diversity
Invasive species should be controlled because they dimin-
ish β diversity homogenizing the biological world
(Wright, 2011). Uniqueness and diversity foster connec-
tions between local citizens and their natural landscape,
which can be lost through it being just like any other
place in the world. This grounds people's local pride in
these systems and justifies their disdain for homogeniza-
tion. Heritage value is created by local people interacting
with their local ecological systems over time. Value is cre-
ated by the acknowledgement of unique experiences
formed by having a relationship to a unique environ-
ment. This can be described as a relational intrinsic value
or as an instrumental value (Elliot, 1992). Heritage and
uniqueness increase ecosystem desirability to not just
local people but also tourists. There is no reason for me
to travel to California to walk through Gum forests. The
Gum forests around Sydney provide the same aesthetic
experience but also possess heritage value derived from
their historical relationship to this place and the other
species within the Australian landscape. This provides
the Sydney Gum forest with a comparative advantage in
its conservation value over the California Gum forest.
The cultural services provided by ecosystems are often
recognized by ecosystem services in studies (Boerema
et al., 2017) but are not represented by the BES relation-
ship built from local species counts.
Global species richness, γ diversity, is of unique heri-
tage value (Wilson, 1992). Not only does it provide local
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people with a unique sense of place in the world, but
unique biotic forms carry information about the past.
Global species diversity is seen as an object of global heri-
tage, comparable to the collection of human sites like the
pyramids of Giza or Stonehenge. Some are sceptical of
invoking global heritage, as its protection can take the
form of colonialism and as such cannot be ethically
enforced (Sarkar, 2019). While we can accept that acting
on global heritage claims at times can be unethical, we
may still hold that such entities are of global value, and
as local conservation actors, we should maintain this
value. Preserving global species richness is the archetypal
commitment of environmentalism. The founding of the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and its Red
List was created with the goal of stopping global extinctions
(IUCN, 2020) and The United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific, and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) World Heri-
tage List was created to preserve sites of heritage value be
they natural or man-made (UNESCO, 2021). While conser-
vationists may accept that we cannot save all species, due to
resource limitations, it does not imply global species preser-
vation is not a goal of conservation. Advocating for allowing
“relic” or “loser” species to become extinct stands in con-
trast to such aims (Pearce, 2015; Thomas, 2017). To claim
that global species loss is secondary to the primary conser-
vation goal of resource production is to reject the founda-
tions of conservation biology.
The emphasis on local diversity and acceptance of
global extinction, proposed by sceptics, stands as a radical
rejection of the principles traditionally associated with con-
servation. Consider the original postulates of conservation
described by Soulé (1985): (a) diversity should be preserved,
(b) untimely extinctions should be prevented, (c) ecological
complexity should be maintained, (d) evolutionary pro-
cesses should continue, and (e) biological diversity has
intrinsic value. Interpreting these postulates as claims about
global or local diversity results in different recommenda-
tions. By solely interpreting diversity locally rather than
globally, sceptics are proposing we, at the minimum, jetti-
son 1, 2, and 5 as global conservation aims. They must
defend such a radical change in conservation values.
Invasive species actively diminish β diversity when
they eliminate endemic biotic variation and replace them
with biotic forms that are found commonly elsewhere.
This not only diminishes heritage value but also option
value. Option value directly connects to β diversity, as
unique features create new options. Option value does
not require large standing populations of high productiv-
ity species, just preserving unique lifeforms because we
may value them in unique and unpredictable ways in the
future.
Preserving diverse biotic features directly entails the
preservation of unique options, it is just a question of
what the best way is to measure diversity to represent the
unknown future uses of life on earth (Lean, 2017).
Attempts to reduce option value to functional diversity
(e.g., Mazel et al., 2018) systematically underestimates
the value of biotic diversity because they ignore the way
human preferences for the environment change over
time, often in unexpected ways. While “swamps” were
not valued highly in yesteryear, many today highly value
“wetlands.” Option value indicates we should preserve
the environment for changing recreational and aesthetic
valuations in addition to its possible immediate economic
uses. There is a range of values that people, when sur-
veyed, hold toward the environment that are not cap-
tured by productivity (see the literature on Wildlife Value
Orientations; e.g., Fulton, Manfredo, & Lipscomb, 1996).
These values change between demographics and over
time. Option value is for preserving biodiversity so other
humans can value different aspects of the environment
in the future.
There are numerous ways to describe the value that
biodiversity provides. Local species richness is inade-
quate. Adding rats, cats, and pigeons to every corner of
the globe does not preserve the heritage or options value
of an area. Possessing unique biotic resources allows
communities to bargain with other communities and fos-
ters their connection to the local environment. These
values require representing the range of lifeforms that
exist across different ecosystems through γ biodiversity
and β diversity. These necessary components of biodiver-
sity preservation are ignored when we solely focus on
ecosystem productivity.
Now one could argue that this dispute is about differ-
ing values rather than equivocation. It is, in one sense.
The critics of invasive species management ascent to a
much narrower conception of conservations goals than
most conservationists have traditionally considered. Only
describing biodiversity as α diversity, rather than admit-
ting the importance of β and γ diversity, and representing
services as being derived from high productivity and
fecundity. They could argue that local species richness is
more significant than both heritage and option value. In
partial agreement with these critics, some have argued
the ecosystem services paradigm justifies not preserving a
large portion of biodiversity (Newman, 2020). But inva-
sive species critics, however, do not provide strong argu-
ments for such a narrowing of the scope of conservation
goals. Instead, they use general terms (biodiversity, eco-
system services) to appear to be agreeing to the more
widely held views about conservation. This appears to be
a rhetorical decision to equivocate for the means of
engagement with conservations aims. What is required of
such critics is a direct argument we should narrow the
goals of conservation for there to be an honest debate
LEAN 7 of 10
about values in conservation. This would then facilitate
the further assessment of the costs and benefits of prefer-
ring such a narrow interpretation over the wider goal's
conservation has traditionally held.
5 | CONCLUSION: BETA
DIVERSITY AND INVASION
Accepting that biodiversity must represent uniqueness
and disparity does not imply we must always control
nonindigenous species in wild spaces. There are a signifi-
cant number of species that are endangered or extinct in
their native habitat but wild in an invasive habitat.
Thompson (2014) frames his discussion of invasive spe-
cies control around the case of the Camel. Wild Camel
populations no longer exist in their native range, but wild
Camel populations move through central Australia. If we
remove this population, we reduce the β diversity of this
habitat and the number of wild populations on earth.
Accepting β diversity as a significant biodiversity measure
indicates we should retain Camel populations in
Australia. This is, however, not without conditions. If an
invasive population threatens multiple endemic native
populations, it will warrant the control or even eradica-
tion of this population. Population control is critical for
populations without consumers. Population control does
not imply local extinction and often the best choice is to
keep the population numbers low enough so that they do
not impact indigenous populations.
The β diversity conservation framework does not
necessitate invasive species control in all cases. The num-
ber of species that are endangered in their native range
and invasive are increasing and include the wattle-
necked soft-shell turtle, the Monterey pine, and the
Barbary Sheep (Marchetti & Engstrom, 2016). There will
be instances where nonindigenous species have moved
into a system and now provide services necessary for the
survival of endemic species. Chew (2009) argues Tama-
risk in the United States is a critical habitat for native
songbirds. In such cases, consideration should be given
to these populations and the role they play in supporting
biotic diversity and uniqueness. This does not, however,
warrant the rejection of invasive species control and
eradication.
Current arguments forwarded by sceptics of invasive
species control engage environmentalists on their own
principles rather than solely forwarding animal welfare
arguments. They contest that on the grounds of preserv-
ing biodiversity and promoting ecosystem services the
control of invasive species is not justified. Their argu-
ments, however, require an impoverished account of bio-
diversity, one which equates local species counts with
biodiversity. This position ignores the importance of
diversity and the disparity of life. It ignores the value of
unique biotic options, and the potential utility these
options could bring, and it ignores the heritage contained
in life on Earth. Such values justify the preservation of
endemic and unique species even when they are not
major contributors to local productivity.
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